# Rationality in Financial Markets: Evidence From Bank Loan Financing Arrangements and Security Analysts' Earnings Forecasts

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## Question

Do banks rationally use analysts' earnings forecasts to determine loan interest rates?

## Simple Example

#### The Scenario

- Assume General Motors (GM) applies for a line of credit from Bank of America
- Problem: Bank may want information regarding GM's future earnings potential or earnings risk
- Solution: Bank may gather security analysts' earnings forecasts for GM

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#### **Rephrase the Question**

Do banks make systematic mistakes accounting for both the exaggerations and the lack of precision in analysts' earnings forecasts?

### Contribution

#### **Three Contributions**

- Examination as to whether banks rationally use analysts' forecasts to determine loan interest rates
- Examine analysts impact on ex-ante cost of capital.
   Previous Literature uses ex-post equity returns.(Rajan and Savares (1997), Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (1999),
   Bradshaw, Skinner, and Sloan (2006), Michaely and Womack (1999))
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## **Simple Model**

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- Bank
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## Analysts' Consensus Earnings Forecasts-A Noisy Signal

- $S^a = \theta + \eta$
- $\theta \sim N\left(\mu_{\theta}, \sigma_{\theta}^{2}\right)$
- $\bullet \ \eta \sim \textit{N}\left(\mu_{\eta}, \sigma_{\eta}^{\textit{2}}\right)$

## Conditional Mean and Variance: Return Per Dollar of Assets

• 
$$\hat{\theta} = \mu_{\theta} + \frac{\sigma_{\theta}^2}{\sigma_{\theta}^2 + \phi \sigma_{\eta}^2} \left( S^a - \mu_{\theta} - \kappa \mu_{\eta} \right)$$
 where  $\kappa < 1, \phi < 1$ 

$$\bullet \hat{\sigma}_{\theta}^2 = \frac{\phi \sigma_{\theta}^2 \sigma_{\eta}^2}{\sigma_{\theta}^2 + \phi \sigma_{\eta}^2}$$

#### **Banks Problem: Maximize Profits**

$$R^* \in \operatorname{arg\,max}_R \pi = BR + E \left[ I\theta - BR | S^a, \theta < \frac{BR}{I} 
ight] - (1 + 
ho) B$$

#### **Solution to Banks Problem**

• 
$$\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial R} = 1 - \Pr\left[\theta < \frac{BR}{I}\right]$$

$$\bullet$$
  $\pi = BR + E \left| I\theta - BR | S^a, \theta < \frac{BR}{I} \right| - (1 + \rho) B = 0$ 

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#### **Correctly Accounting For The Forecast Bias**

$$\bullet \ \frac{\partial R^*}{\partial S^a} = -\frac{\sigma_\theta^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 + \phi \sigma_\eta^2} \frac{E\left[ (I\theta - BR^*) \frac{\left(\theta - \hat{\theta}\right)}{\hat{\sigma}_\theta^2} | S^a, \theta < \frac{BR^*}{I} \right]}{\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial R^*}} < 0$$

$$\bullet \ \, \frac{\partial R^*}{\partial \mu_{\eta}} = \frac{\kappa \sigma_{\theta}^2}{\sigma_{\theta}^2 + \phi \sigma_{\eta}^2} \frac{E\left[ (I\theta - BR^*) \frac{(\theta - \hat{\theta})}{\hat{\sigma}_{\theta}^2} | S^a, \theta < \frac{BR^*}{I} \right]}{\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial R^*}} > 0$$

$$\bullet$$
  $\frac{\partial R^*}{\partial S^a} + \frac{\partial R^*}{\partial \mu_{\eta}} = 0$  for  $\kappa = 1$ 

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• 
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$$ullet$$
  $rac{\partial R^*}{\partial \mathcal{S}^a} + rac{\partial R^*}{\partial \mu_\eta} = 0 ext{ for } \kappa = 1$ 

## **Correctly Accounting For The Lack of Precision**

$$\phi = \frac{\sigma_{\theta}^2 \frac{\partial R^*}{\partial \mu_{\theta}}}{\sigma_{\eta}^2 \frac{\partial R^*}{\partial S^a}} = 1$$

## **Empirical Estimation**

#### Data

- DEALSCAN
- I/B/E/S
- COMPLISTAT

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#### **Econometric Model**

$$INTR_{i,t} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 RQ_{i,t} + \beta_2 MFE_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 MPE_{i,t-1} + \gamma Z + \omega_i + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

## **Comparative Static Estimates**

- $\frac{\partial R^*}{\partial S^a} \Rightarrow \beta_1$
- $\frac{\partial R^*}{\partial \mu_{\eta}} \Rightarrow \beta_2$
- $\frac{\partial R^*}{\partial \mu_{\theta}} \Rightarrow \beta_3$

#### **Estimation Methodology**

- GMM System Estimator
- Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998)

## **Results**

Long Term Earnings Forecast	-0.0895***
	(0.0371)
Mean of Past Forecast Errors	2.4477***
	(1.0637)
Stdev of Past Forecast Errors	0.0086
	(1.1722)
Mean of Past Earnings	-1.8310***
	(0.4975)
Number of Firms	1890
Number of Observations	5777
P-Value Hansen Test of Overidentifying Restrictions	0.259
Test of Second Order Serial Correlation P-Value	0.271

## **Results**

Current Fiscal Year Earnings Forecast	-1.5724***
	(0.6718)
Mean of Past Forecast Errors	2.0572***
	(1.0700)
Stdev of Past Forecast Errors	3.1131***
	(1.3111)
Mean of Past Earnings	-0.9170***
	(0.4544)
Number of Firms	2233
Number of Observations	6826
P-Value Hansen Test of Overidentifying Restrictions	0.262
Test of Second Order Serial Correlation P-Value	0.404

#### **Econometric Model**

$$\begin{aligned} \textit{INTR}_{i,t} &= \\ \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \textit{RQ}_{i,t} + \beta_2 \textit{MFE}_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \textit{MPE}_{i,t-1} + \gamma \textit{Z} + \omega_i + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{i,t} \end{aligned}$$

#### **Econometric Tests**

• 
$$\frac{\partial R^*}{\partial S^a} + \frac{\partial R^*}{\partial \mu_{\eta}} \Rightarrow \beta_1 + \beta_2 = 0.48 \Rightarrow \kappa \Rightarrow 1.30$$

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# **Does Earnings Forecast Proxy for the Banks Private Information**

• 
$$RQ_{i,t} = RQ_{i,t}^b + v_{i,t}$$

• 
$$COV\left[\omega_{i} + \varepsilon_{i,t} + \beta_{1}v_{i,t}, \Delta RQ_{i,t-s}^{b} + \Delta v_{i,t-s}\right] \neq 0$$

• 
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- $COV\left[\Delta \varepsilon_{i,t} + \beta_1 \Delta v_{i,t}, RQ_{i,t-z}^b + v_{i,t-z}\right] \neq 0$

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- $COV\left[\Delta\varepsilon_{i,t} + \beta_1\Delta\upsilon_{i,t}, RQ_{i,t-z}^b + \upsilon_{i,t-z}\right] \neq 0$

## **Conclusions**

- Banks account for forecast bias and precision
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